



~APAN: GROWTH AND PROSPECTS
MMER 19The subject of Japan has always generated
extreme opinions. In 1929, John E. Orchard
said, "The causes that have retarded progress are
so fundamental and so permanent that Japan
cannot hope to become a manufacturing nation
ofmajor rank." But in 1970, Herman Kahnsaid,
"The Japanese have, in effect, discovered or
developed an ability to grow, economically, with
a rapidity...that might well result, late in the
twentieth century or early in the twenty-first, in
Japan's possessing the largest gross national
product in the world."
Serious students ofJapanare awareofthe fact
that Japanese economic history provides many
examples of both significant achievements and
significant failings. This issue of the Economic
Review provides evidence on both scores. The
first article is an essay in the perennially reward-
ing field of growth analysis. The second article
represents a first attempt to analyze a new
financial phenomenon-the comparative record
of American banks in Japan and of Japanese
banks in the United States. The final article, in
contrast, discusses an inefficient sector of the
Japanese economy--agriculture, which penal-
izes Japanese urban consumers with some ofthe
highest food prices in the world.
Martin Bronfenbrenner, on the basis of a
lifetime of study in this area, summarizes his
views of the Japanese growth process in the lead
article. He notes that Japan has experienced not
one but two "economic miracles"duringthe past
century. The first miracle, which coincided
roughly with the Meiji Era (1867-1912), pro-
pelled Japan in halfa centuryto a world econom-
ic power of the second class-"itself a unique
accomplishment for a non-European country
with few significant natural resources, no signifi-
cant Western population, and no history of
Western colonization or dominance." The sec-
ond miracle, which coincided roughly with the
post-World War II period, "not only surpassed
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all extrapolations of prewar growth but also
lifted Japan past Britain, France and Germany
to the position of the world's third-ranking
economic power."
Bronfenbrenner finds two schools of thought
disagreeing over the causes ofthe two economic
miracles. "The 'one-sword' school explains Ja-
panese growth with a theory that cuts through a
vital point ofthe economy·-a point so vital that
a push would set the whole economy pulsating.
The 'literary' school contents itselfwith arraying
large numbers of 'factors responsible' for what-
ever one is trying to explain." Bronfenbrenner
personally leans toward the first school, his
candidate for the role of"sword" being in Keyne-
sian terms the high marginal efficiency ofprivate
domestic capital investment. But high marginal
efficiency depends on public policies which dim-
inish risk, such as those which provide major
industries with guarantees against failure, finan-
cial stringency, or substantial layoffs of perma-
nent workers.
Going further, Bronfenbrenner finds analo-
gies to the three swords worn by the hero in every
samurai movie. The power ofthe broad-sword-
marginal efficiency augmented by risk diminu-
tion-has been supplemented by two additional
aids to growth. One is the "short sword" of
forced frugality, brought about by the "tax" of
secular inflation. The other is the "dagger" ofa
highly productive, highly trained, and flexible
labor force. These are in turn induced by two
features of Japanese industrial relations: the
"permanent" employment of rigorously and
credentially selected employees and the weak-
ness ofcraft unionism. Theauthoralso mentions
several alternative explanations: a high private
saving rate, low expenditures on national de-
fense, cheap access to foreign technology, and
yen undervaluation. But he emphasizes the im-
portance of the three "swords," and gives the
Japanese high marks for avoiding excesses (andincurring negative returns) when bringing those
weapons into play.
In the second article on banking, Henry S.
Terrell attempts to measure the impact of econ-
omic factors- such as growing trade flows and
expanding local markets-which have affected
the lending activities of American banks in
Japan and of Japanese banks in the United
States. In both cases, lending activity increased
significantly between late 1972 and late 1978,
although the growth pace fluctuated somewhat
during that period. In the Japanese market,
U.s.-bank branch claims on nonbanks (mostly
loans) amounted to 2.3 percent of comparable
loans and discounts at the large Japanese City
Banks in November 1978. In the American
market, the ratio ofcommercial-industrial lend-
ing ofJapanese institutions to comparable U.S.
weekly reporting banks reached 11.5 percent last
November.
A model developed by Terrell did quite well in
explaining the growth in lendingactivities ofthe
two groups ofbanks. Changes in lendingby U.S.
banks in Japan were positively related to growth
in local-bank lending, to growth iii. total Jap-
anese trade, and to the degree ofease in theJapa-
nese banking system-and negatively related to
the degree of ease in the U.S. banking system.
Meanwhile, growth in lending by Japanese
banks in the U.S. market was positively related
to the growth of the local U.S. market, and very
strongly related to growth in total Japanese
trade-and related to banking-marketease in the
same way as were U.S. banks in Japan.
Yet certain key differences showed up in this
analysis. The model indicates that growth in
total Japanese trade strongly affects lending by
U.S. offices of Japanese banks, reinforcing the
widely-held view about the importance of those
institutions in financing Japanese trade. In addi-
tion, Terrell shows that the impact of 10caI-
market growth on foreign-bank loan growth is
much smaller for U.S. banks in Japan than for
Japanese banks in the United States. This sug-
gests that regulatory restraints on U.S. banks
may have affected their ability to participate in
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the growth of the local Japanese market. "By
contrast, Japanese banks in this country have
been more free to expand their branch networks,
operate subsidiary banks, and develop local
sources of funding, and thus have been better
able to benefit from growth in the local market."
In a third article, Michael Gorham considers
one of the problem areas which mar Japan's
otherwise strong economic performance-
agriculture, which is a very high-cost supplier of
food to the nation's consumers. Japanese con-
sumers spend 39 percent of their budgets for
food, compared with only 19 percent for U.S.
consumers. These high food costs reflect the
existence of a relatively inefficient agricultural
sector, which is protected by a comprehensive
system oftariffs and importquotas. "Thatpolicy
reflects both the rurally-biased distribution of
national political power and consumers' fears
about the security of Japan's food supply."
Gorham examines an alternative and poten-
tially cheaper food strategy-the removal ofall
barriers to grain and soybean imports, along
with the creation of a one-year contingency
stockpile ofeach ofthose commodities. He finds
that the cost ofstockpiling would have exceeded
the net social cost of the current program in the
mid-1970's, but he claims that the cost relation-
ship probably would be reversed by the mid-
1980's. By 1985, current policies could cost
almost $8 billion, while the stockpile approach
could run a little over $1 billion. But he cautions,
"A switch to a stockpile approach could have a
dramatic impact on the domesticfarm economy,
with falling prices, production, land values and
incomes. Thus ifsuch a policy switch took place,
it would have to be implemented slowly."
Noting Japanese fears about secure food sup-
plies, Gorham contends that the solution may
center around the development ofa major food-
processing industry. "By becoming a supplier as
well as a demander of foodstuffs, Japan could
become an important part of the world food-
supply system-one which could not be easily
cut off in times of food shortages."